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Injection anthrax was described first in 2000 in a 
heroin-injecting drug user in Norway. New anthrax 
cases among heroin consumers were detected in the 
United Kingdom (52 cases) and Germany (3 cases) 
in 2009-10. In June 2012, a fatal case occurred in 
Regensburg, Bavaria. As of December 2012, 13 cases 
had been reported in this new outbreak from Germany, 
Denmark, France and the United Kingdom. We ana-
lysed isolates from 2009-10 and 2012 as well as from 
the first injection anthrax case in Norway in 2000 by 
comparative molecular typing using a high resolution 
31 marker multilocus variable-number tandem repeat 
analysis (MLVA) and a broad single nucleotide poly-
morphism (SNP) analysis. Our results show that all 
cases may be traced back to the same outbreak strain. 
They also indicate the probability of a single source 
contaminating heroin and that the outbreak could 
have lasted for at least a decade. However, an addi-
tional serological pilot study in two German regions 
conducted in 2011 failed to discover additional anthrax 
cases among 288 heroin users. 
Introduction
Anthrax infections occur world-wide, but are more 
frequent in countries with subtropical climate for 
example in southern Europe, the Balkans, south-east 
Asia, South America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Primary 
infections predominantly occur in ungulates, whereas 
human infections are rather rare and usually associ-
ated with contact to infected animals or contaminated 
animal products, such as meat, fur, bone meal, wool or 
hair [1,2]. Human to human transmission is rare.
Figure 1
Published laboratory-confirmed anthrax cases in heroin users 2000 to 2012 as of 31 December 2012 (n=69)
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In humans, depending on the route of infection, four 
types of anthrax infections have been defined [3]. 
Cutaneous anthrax (Pustula maligna) is the most fre-
quent (approx. 95%) and least severe form. It is char-
acterised by infection of the skin, most probably via 
micro lesions or injured skin. Other forms are intestinal 
and respiratory anthrax. Injection anthrax is a recently 
defined type of anthrax which is transmitted by sub-
cutaneous, intramuscular or intravenous injection of 
contaminated drugs. Patients typically present a mas-
sive oedema around the injection site often leading to 
compartment syndrome or necrotising fasciitis [4-6]. 
Since the clinical picture strongly differs from the clas-
sical picture of cutaneous anthrax [7], injection anthrax 
is difficult to diagnose and treat adequately. Classical 
signs i.e. papules, vesicles or eschar are often missing, 
whereas complications such as septic and cardiovas-
cular shock, meningitis and death despite antibiotic 
therapy, occur more often than in cases of classical 
cutaneous anthrax [8,9]. Furthermore, the differential 
diagnosis is hampered by unspecific skin and soft tis-
sue infections that injecting drug users (IDUs) often 
develop around the site of injection. Despite medical 
treatment, we calculated a case fatality rate of over 
30%, based on the currently available published infor-
mation and which depends on time and considered 
patients [10].
Bacillus anthracis is a gram-positive, spore-forming, 
aerobic rod-like bacterium which grows in chains and 
is surrounded by a capsule under microaerophilic 
conditions (cultivation at 5% CO2 percentage of air) 
[2]. The bacterium is classified as biological Hazard 
Group 3 agent [11]. In Germany and at European level, 
a suspected or laboratory-confirmed anthrax infection 
according to the case definition is notifiable and has 
to be reported to the German health authorities who 
forward the information to the European surveillance 
system (TESSy) operated by the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) in Stockholm, 
Sweden. Particular characteristics of anthrax spores 
are their extreme resistance against unfavourable 
environmental influences over a long period of time, 
enabling them to survive for decades. Spore decontam-
ination requires autoclaving or appropriate chemical 
disinfectants such as peracetic acid or formaldehyde 
[12]. 
The diagnosis of anthrax is mainly based on polymer-
ase chain reaction (PCR) directed against the virulence 
plasmid markers and isolation of the pathogen from 
clinical samples [2]. Specific antibody detection can 
support the diagnoses or discover anthrax cases in 
epidemiological investigations [13,14].
Early antibiotic therapy [3] is required and schemes 
for chemoprophylaxis as well as passive and active 
vaccination are available although vaccines are only 
approved in some European countries [4,15].
Three outbreaks of injection anthrax in heroin users 
have been detected so far in Europe (Figure1). The 
first case was reported from Norway in 2000 [16] 
and in 2009-10, a total of 119 similar cases occurred 
in Scotland of which 47 were laboratory-confirmed 
anthrax cases. Further five cases were reported from 
England and three from Germany with one case retro-
spectively detected by serology in a heroin user recov-
ered from a severe disease compatible with injection 
anthrax [4,17,18]. The most recent outbreak started 
in 2012 and as of December 2012 at least 13 cases 
occurred in Germany, France, Denmark and United 
Kingdom [10,19-24], five of whom died. Since all cases 
of injection anthrax identified involved exclusively 
active heroin users, contaminated heroin appears to 
be the most likely source of infection [4].  
In our study we were interested to investigate by molec-
ular typing of the isolates whether the first observed 
case of injection anthrax in 2000 was related to the 
more recent cases. Moreover, it is not known if the 
detected cases of injection anthrax over time reflect 
the real number of infections or if they are the tip of 
an iceberg. To investigate this question, a retrospec-
tive pilot study among German IDUs, including a ques-
tionnaire and serology, was initiated and this study is 
presented here in brief.   
Table 1
Isolates from anthrax cases in injecting drug users between 
2000 and 2012 used for molecular typing
Designation Year of isolation Source
A112a, A112ba 2009 Friedrich-Loeffler-Institute, Jena,  Germany 
A138 2010 Friedrich-Loeffler-Institute, Jena, Germany
A294 2012 Statens Serum Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark
A306 2012 Statens Serum Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark
A303b 2012 Charité Berlin, Robert Koch Institute, Berlin, Germany
A315/1, A315/2c 2000 Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway
a  A112a and A112b refer to different colony morphologies of the 
same isolate.
b  Only DNA from clinical sample, skin swab, available.
c  Isolates from the same case, below summarised as A315_2000.  
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Table 2
Code values for the 31 markers used in multilocus variable-number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA)
MLVA-Marker
Expected Fragment Lengths (bp) Observed 
Fragment 
Lengths (bp)
Code-No.  
[24]    
reference 
Ames 
ancestorA112a (2009) A112b (2009) A138 (2010)
A294, A303, 
A306 (2012)
A315/1, 
A315/2 (2000)
Bams 1 422 422 422 422 422 425-429 13 2
Bams 3 609 609 609 609 609 616 30 8
Bams 5 307 307 307 307 307 304-305 5 26
Bams 13 454 454 454 454 454 456 30 13
Bams 15 616 616 616 616 616 616-619 46 5
Bams 21 676 676 676 676 676 673-676 9 25
Bams 22 735 735 735 735 735 727-731 13 16
Bams 23 651 651 651 651 651 644-648 10 53
Bams 24 595 595 595 595 595 604-609 9 70
Bams 25 376 376 376 376 376 379-380 3 17
Bams 28 493 493 493 493 493 500-501 14 14
Bams 30 862 889 889 889 889 876/902-906 72 / 75 15
Bams 31 772 772 772 772 772 776 64 8
Bams 34 425 425 425 425 425 431-433 7 64
Bams 44 417 417 417 417 417 422-425 8 4
Bams 51 493 493 493 493 493 501 9 4
Bams 53 236 236 236 236 236 234-235 8 9
CG3 158 158 158 158 158 157 2 9
pXO1 135 135 135 135 135 133 9 9
pXO2 137 137 137 139 141 136/138/140 7 / 8 / 9 6
vrrA 314 314 314 314 314 311-312 4 9
vrrB1 229 229 229 229 229 226 17 9
vrrB2 162 162 162 162 162 159-160 14 13
vrrC1 616 616 616 616 616 621-630 57 10
vrrC2 604 604 604 604 604 603-605 19 57
VNTR 12 115 115 115 115 115 113-114 6 4
VNTR 16 273 273 273 273 273 266-270 8 4
VNTR 17 386 386 386 386 386 386-387 4 6
VNTR 19-2 99 99 99 99 99 96-97 5 4
VNTR 23 197 197 197 197 197 195-196 4 8
VNTR 35 109 109 109 109 109 109-110 3 4
A112a and b, A138 Germany (2 different cases)
A294, A306  Denmark (2 different cases)
A303   Germany  
A315/1, A315/2 Norway (2 isolates from same case)
Code numbers are identical with copy numbers of the repeat sequences, where possible. For the purpose of normalisation the appropriate 
copy code numbers are added for the Ames Ancestor strain as deduced from the sequence available at GenBank, accession no.: AE017334.2 
GI:50082967. Expected fragment lengths are taken from the values of alleles provided by Lista et al. in 2006 [27] and deduced from 
sequences of Bacillus anthracis available at Genbank. Values of alleles not published were artificially added by interpolation using the 
appropriate repeat lengths.
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Methods
Molecular typing of Bacillus 
anthracis outbreak strains
Bacterial isolates found in drug-related clinical anthrax 
cases are shown in Table 1. Template DNA for PCR was 
either isolated using the DNeasy Blood & Tissue Kit 
(Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) or by boiling of colony mate-
rial in PBS in a thermoblock at 110 °C for 20 min. 
Multilocus variable-number tandem repeat analy-
sis (MLVA) for analysis of 31 markers was performed 
with multiplex PCR and capillary electrophoresis as 
described [25,26]. Code numbers in Table 2 reflect the 
copy numbers of the repeat sequences, where possible. 
For the purpose of normalisation, the appropriate copy 
code numbers are added for the Ames Ancestor strain 
as deduced from the sequence available at GenBank, 
accession No.: AE017334.2 GI:50082967. Expected 
fragment lengths are taken from the values of alleles 
provided by [27] and deduced from sequences of 
B. anthracis available in Genbank. Values of alleles not 
published were artificially added by interpolation using 
the appropriate repeat lengths. Data were processed 
using Bionumerics software package version 5.10 
(Applied Maths). For cluster analysis by unweighted 
pair group method with Arithmetic Mean (UPGMA) a 
categorical coefficient was used. 
Single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) analyses for 
the 13 canonical SNPs (canSNPs) described by Van 
Ert et al. in 2007 [28] as well as for the two SNPs, 
SNP1173928 and SNP1053700, which were identified 
to be specific for the outbreak strains from 2009-
10 [29] were performed using conventional PCR and 
sequencing of the appropriate regions with stand-
ard methods. Further SNPs (A.Br.011, SNP5013862, 
SNP1967560, SNP1118831, SNP1530761, SNP3287006 
and SNP3836105) with increasing specificity for the 
‘heroin isolates’ [29] were additionally included. 
The methods and results for the pilot study on retro-
spective case finding are presented under a separate 
heading.
Results
Multilocus variable-number tandem 
repeat analysis (MLVA) 
The results from the MLVA showed that ‘heroin 
anthrax’ isolates including strain A315_2000 belong to 
the European A cluster. Interestingly, two slightly dif-
ferent colony morphologies were observed for isolate 
A112, and further subcultivation resulted in subclones 
A112a and A112b. These subclones differed by three 
repeat units in marker Bams30. All other MLVA mark-
ers were identical in all isolates tested, except for the 
marker for the virulence plasmid pXO2 (Table 3). The 
oldest isolates from the year 2000 (A315/1 and A315/2) 
from the same patient in Norway, held nine AT repeats; 
Figure 2
Cluster analysis of Bacillus anthracis outbreak isolates from 
Europe, Asia and southern Africa (n=904)
Dendrogram based on multilocus variable-number tandem 
repeat analysis (MLVA-31) typing of isolates. Diamond shapes 
indicate the ‘heroin anthrax’ isolates. For the cluster analysis by 
unweighted pair group method with arithmetic mean (UPGMA) a 
categorical coefficient was used.
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the outbreak isolates from 2009-10 had seven repeats 
and the latest isolates from 2012 carried eight repeats. 
A comparison of the heroin-related strains with a col-
lection of 904 isolates from Europe, Asia and southern 
Africa is shown in Figure 2.
The minimum spanning tree of the investigated iso-
lates is shown in figure 3. The F-complex comprises 
the eight drug-related isolates arranged according to 
the number of different markers (one each between 
the clusters). The sequence of clusters is not expected 
to reflect the true ancestry of the isolates because of 
the high mutability and possible homoplasy in both 
markers Bams30 and pXO2. Interestingly, both the 
F- and the G-complex are clearly differentiated from 
the rest of the European and worldwide isolates by 
seven variable-number tandem repeat (VNTR)-markers, 
though still differing from each other by another four 
VNTR-markers. Whether or not this indicates an ancient 
common group of ancestors could only be answered 
by including the VNTR-data of strains from the east 
Turkish region, which are considered near relatives of 
the heroin-based isolates by the SNP-analysis. 
Figure 3
Minimum spanning tree isolates of Bacillus anthracis typed by 31-marker multilocus variable-number tandem repeat analysis 
(MLVA) (n=904)
A:  Namibian A
B:  South African A
C:  Namibian A
D:  European, Caucasian, Namibian A
E:  South African A
F:  Drug-related A
G:  French A
H:  German A
I:  Sterne-like A
J:  European A
K:  European B
L:  South African B
F cluster 1: A112b (2009), A138 (2010)
F cluster 2: A112a (2009)
F cluster 3: A294, A303, A306 (2012)
F cluster 4: A315/1, A315/2 (2000)
Clustering of multilocus variable-number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) profiles was done using a categorical coefficient. MLVA-Genotypes 
(GT) are displayed as circles. The size of each circle symbolises the number of isolates of this particular GT. GTs differing in only one marker 
are combined in a complex seen as a coloured halo if at least three GTs fulfil this criterion. Distances between circles do not reflect the 
correct phylogenetic distances. The letters A and B in the legend reflect the main MLVA clusters as defined by Keim et al in 2000 [26]. The 
F-complex comprises the eight drug-related isolates.
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Single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) analyses
As already shown for the isolates from the outbreak 
of 2009-10, canSNP genotyping (13 SNPs) of all iso-
lates tested in this study revealed that they belong to 
the A.Br.008/009 group, the so-called Trans-Eurasian 
group [28]. The presence of seven further SNPs 
(A.Br.011, SNP5013862, SNP1967560, SNP1118831, 
SNP1530761, SNP3287006 and SNP3836105) with 
increasing specificity, that were used to identify the 
closest relatives of the outbreak isolates, were also 
confirmed (Table 3). In addition, all isolates shared 
the two SNPs (SNP1173928 and SNP1053700) that were 
shown to be distinctive for the anthrax cases in heroin 
users. The presence of these two SNPs was confirmed 
in 36 isolates from the outbreak in 2009-10 [29]. Most 
markedly, these two SNPs were also identified in the 
Norwegian isolates from the year 2000, in addition to 
all other tested SNPs characteristic for the more recent 
outbreak isolates. In summary, all strains isolated 
between the years 2000 and 2012 which were ana-
lysed in our and in previous studies shared the same 
22 SNPs including the two highly distinctive ‘heroin-
specific’ SNPs.
Pilot study on retrospective 
case finding in Germany 
Retrospective case finding was performed by two 
approaches and is here presented in brief. First, 
medical personnel from 10 academic medical cen-
tres from different parts of Germany responded to a 
questionnaire to discover retrospectively anamnestic 
indications for possible clinical signs and symptoms 
of injection anthrax for the period between January 
2009 and spring 2011. For this clinical search the fol-
lowing case definition of injection anthrax was used: 
’All cases with history of current heroin use and with 
clinical picture of massive oedema, compartment syn-
drome and/or a necrotising fasciitis at the injection site 
are considered possible injection anthrax.’ 
Second, a serological investigation was conducted for 
which 288 serum samples were available. In spring 
2011, 44 anonymised sera were obtained in coopera-
tion with the Ministry of Justice of Baden-Wuerttemberg 
from 20 correctional facilities located in this federal 
state. Two hundred forty-four capillary blood samples 
collected as dried blood spots were collected from May 
until July 2011 in framework the DRUCK-Study, a sero- 
and behavioural survey directed on the risk of viral 
infections among injecting drug users in Berlin. This 
study was piloted by the HIV/AIDS, sexually transmit-
ted and blood-borne infections unit, department for 
Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Robert Koch Institute, 
Berlin, in close collaboration with low threshold drop-
in facilities in Berlin. Questions on previous clinical 
signs and symptoms compatible with drug-related 
anthrax were added to the questionnaire. Informed 
consent was provided by all study participants and the 
study was approved by the Federal Commissioner for 
Data Protection and Freedom of Information as well as 
the respective responsible Ethics Review Committee. 
Table 3
Single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) for clustering and strain identification in isolates from anthrax cases in injecting drug 
users between 2000 and 2012 (n=8)
Method Strains  2009-2012  in this study
Strain A315_2000 
 in this study
Other outbreak strains with 
reference to Price et al.[28] [30] Peculiarities
13 SNPs PCR [28] 
Present indicating 
as a member of 
A.Br.008/009 group
Present indicating 
as a member of 
A.Br.008/009
group
A.Br.008/009 group;
36 isolates including outbreak 
type strain Ba4599 were typed 
to this group
384/1,033 worldwide isolates 
were typed to A.Br.008/009 
group representing a subset of 
Trans-Eurasian group [28]
A.Br.011 PCR [29]
Present indicating as a 
member of the 
A.Br.008/011 lineage
Present indicating as a 
member of the 
A.Br.008/011
lineage
A.Br.008/011
outbreak type strain Ba4599
120 other isolates from 
different countries, including 
six Turkish isolates [29]
3 additional SNPs [29]
- 5013862
- 1967560
- 1118831
Present Present Present outbreak type strain Ba4599
Present in Turkish isolates 
A0149 and A0264 but not in 
four other Turkish strains [29]
3 additional SNPs [29] 
- 1530761
- 3287006
- 3836105
Present Present Present outbreak type strain Ba4599
Present in Turkish isolates 
A0149 and A0264 but not in 
four other Turkish strains [29]
2 additional SNPs [29]
- 10553700 - 1173928 Present Present
Present
in 36 isolates including 
outbreak type strain Ba4599
Not in A0149 and A0264 and 
four other Turkish strains [29] 
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 The sera were tested for specific antibodies against 
the anthrax toxin component protective antigen (PA) 
using an accredited in-house ELISA (specificity 100%; 
sensitivity 1:16,000 for sera, 1:24,000 for plasma) and 
Western blot analysis (specificity 100%; sensitivity 
1:200,000 for sera, 1:100,000 for plasma). In the case 
of positive results it was intended to test against fur-
ther anthrax antigens (LF, EF). 
The clinical study identified one male heroin con-
sumer from the north of Germany, with acute soft tis-
sue inflammation, abscess and sepsis by anamnestic 
investigation, but serology did not confirm anthrax. 
Questionnaires accompanying the serological study 
revealed anamnestic clinical signs that could corre-
spond with injection anthrax in 34 of 288 individuals 
(compartment syndrome n=24, 8.3%; fasciitis n=10, 
3.5%). All 288 sera were negative for antibodies against 
PA in ELISA and also Western blot where tested. 
Discussion
Through molecular analyses we obtained evidence 
that a similar source of contamination of heroin, caus-
ing injection anthrax in IDUs, could have been active 
at least since the year 2000. The typing approaches 
showed that the B. anthracis isolates from the first 
injection anthrax patient in Norway in 2000 was almost 
identical in the studied key elements for molecular typ-
ing, with the strain causing an outbreak among IDUs 
and represented in the study by six isolates obtained 
from five clinical cases between 2009 and 2012. Earlier 
SNP analyses of a large strain collection showed the 
outbreak strain is closest related to strains from a cer-
tain region in Turkey, while it is not related to strains 
from Afghanistan or Pakistan, the countries assumed 
to be the primary source of the heroin consumed in 
Europe [4,29]. However, higher numbers of typed 
strains from these regions might be required to local-
ise where the putative contamination of the heroin 
occurred. 
In our study, the MLVA-profile from seven isolates and 
one blood sample revealed the presence of four highly 
related genotypes, differing only in two highly mutable 
markers, Bams30 and pXO2. While the former differ-
ence was found in the same sample from a patient in 
the 2009 outbreak (A112a and b), the plasmid marker 
differed between the isolates from the cases in 2000, 
2009-10 and 2012, respectively. All other markers 
tested were identical, and therefore the four different 
MLVA genotypes can be considered as one strain caus-
ing the outbreak. 
Previous studies confirmed that MLVA markers are sta-
ble during routine bacteriological diagnosis and pas-
sage in mice and rabbits [30,31], but the analysis of 
animal outbreaks in Namibia showed that especially 
the markers Bams30 and pXO2 are frequently mutat-
ing. Deviations in only one highly mutable marker, 
particularly the plasmid marker pXO2, in temporally 
distant isolates from a defined endemic region are well 
known [25]. The putative evolutionary analysis gener-
ating minimum spanning trees clusters such isolates 
into single complexes. Combined with epidemiological 
data gained in the investigation of outbreak scenarios, 
such complexes of highly related genotypes can be 
considered the same outbreak strain. 
MLVA data are placing the group of anthrax isolates 
related to drug abuse in a distinct but closely related 
cluster on the background of about 900 isolates from 
Europe, Asia, and southern Africa. Without the possi-
bility to compare the clinical isolates with any isolates 
from the source of infection it remains speculative 
whether the differences found are the result of newly 
arising mutations during the course of infection or 
whether the drugs injected by the IDUs were already 
contaminated with different genotypes. In the latter 
case, these markers could be useful in tracing back the 
source of contamination to its origin.
 In view of the current understanding of the evolution-
ary development of B. anthracis [28], measurable vari-
ations in repetitive sequences would be expected to 
occur only during replication within an infected host. 
Earlier investigations on B. anthracis strains after in 
vivo passage in artificially infected laboratory animals 
failed to reveal newly arisen mutations in any marker 
[30,31]. In nature rather slowly proceeding or even 
chronic courses of disease, occurring in host species 
with low susceptibility for anthrax may be the cause for 
the emergence of new genotypes. Whether this is the 
case also in human hosts can only be unravelled once 
the source of infection is available for comparison.
 The results taken together show that all investigated 
isolates are closely related and it can be concluded 
that they belong to the same B. anthracis strain despite 
small observed variations.
For SNP analyses we followed the schemes described 
by van Ert et al in 2007 and Price et al in 2012 [28,29]. 
The whole cascade of investigation including two very 
specific SNPs indicates that the isolate A315 obtained 
from a heroin user with anthrax in Norway in 2000 
was identical in all markers with the here investigated 
isolates from 2009 to 2012. Furthermore the results 
showed that our strains were completely identical with 
the previously analysed strains from the 2009-10 and 
2012 outbreaks [29,32]. These analyses provide further 
evidence that all isolates from anthrax patients prob-
ably infected by contaminated heroin samples belong 
to one similar outbreak strain.
 This may imply that the contamination of heroin is an 
on-going process and could occur during the process-
ing of heroin samples in facilities exposed to the iden-
tified strain of B. anthracis. It cannot be excluded that 
more infections not recognised by clinical examination 
or laboratory investigation have occurred, especially 
if the sudden death of an IDU was ascribed to heroin 
intoxication. The outbreaks identified may represent 
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the tip of an iceberg, recognised because high num-
bers of individuals were affected and the elevated 
awareness of clinicians as the result of the outbreak in 
2009-10. Thus, it is highly important to maintain this 
awareness by clinicians, microbiological laboratory 
staff and public health authorities as well as street 
workers and heroin users themselves. Early detection 
of new cases will improve the chances of successful 
treatment of an otherwise often fatal injection anthrax 
infection and allow the immediate implementation of 
preventive measures. Besides injection anthrax, fur-
ther forms of application of heroin causing diverse 
manifestations of anthrax e.g. respiratory anthrax 
after inhalation, should be taken into account in this 
context.
It is possible in general to infer a previous exposure to 
B. anthracis from the detection of anthrax-specific anti-
bodies in sera [14,33,34]. Serology could be applied to 
support diagnoses in late stages of acute anthrax and 
in retrospective epidemiological investigations to dis-
cover patients who had been exposed to B. anthracis 
or have recovered from a clinical disease compatible 
with anthrax [6]. However, a serological pilot study 
including 288 heroin consumers performed in two 
regions of Germany, Berlin and south-west Germany 
during 2009 to 2011, did not reveal possible additional 
anthrax cases. The limitations of this study were firstly 
that samples were only available from two regions in 
Germany and it can thus not be excluded that posi-
tive cases in other regions were missed. Secondly, the 
number of investigated IDUs was low due to the lim-
ited access to individuals in framework of this study. 
However, to our knowledge, there have been no further 
publications so far on serological studies focusing on 
anthrax in IDUs.
In conclusion, high resolution MLVA31 and SNP13 plus 
a cascade of SNP analyses and two very specific SNPs 
identified all studied isolates from the anthrax outbreak 
in IDUs in 2009-10 and 2012 as the same strain. Most 
interestingly, the Norwegian isolate from the year 2000 
was also identified by all applied methods as the same 
outbreak strain. It can be concluded that most likely 
the outbreak has been going on since at least the year 
2000 with a highly probable similar source of contami-
nation which might be still active. It seems probable 
that cases have remained undetected since this time 
and a joint international epidemiological investigation 
could contribute to clarify this issue. Identification and 
abolishment of the contamination source would be the 
most effective preventive measure. However, this is a 
challenge that could be only achieved by close coop-
eration of scientists, public health authorities and law 
enforcement agencies. Awareness by physicians and 
patients is most important for an early and effective 
treatment.
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